Political Economy

What impact do incentive structures have on the effectiveness of bureaucratic institutions? Under what conditions are politicians responsive to their citizen's needs and accountable to their voters? How can governments design reforms to improve economic outcomes?

Robin Burgess' work on political economy has been focused on ways to improve state capacity. He has worked with the government of India on tax system reform, and with the governments of Myanmar, India, and Pakistan on reforms of the energy sector.

 

Bureaucracy and Development

With Timothy J. Besley, Adnan Khan and Guo Xu

The Annual Review of Economics, 2022, 14: 397-424.

Published version

 

Abstract
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in whether and how bureaucratic effectiveness contributes to development. Just what makes for an effective bureaucracy and what are the building blocks of state capacity remain subject to debate. This article reviews the arguments connecting contemporary research using administrative data and field experiments to wider discussions of the origins of state capacity. Most current research has focused on understanding specific features of the environment in which bureaucrats operate. We connect this to discussions of bureaucratic systems, specifically the relationship to politics, citizens, firms, and nongovernmental organizations. Read more...
 

Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance

With Guo Xu and Marianne Bertrand

The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2021

Published Paper  

Press Coverage: VoxDev   VoxEU  

Abstract
How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1,472 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975-2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers. Read more...
 

Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia

With Clare Balboni, Anton Heil, Jonathan Old, and Ben Olken

The American Economic Association: Papers & Proceedings

Published Paper Online Appendix  

Abstract
This paper examines the link between electoral incentives and environmental degradation by exploiting a satellite data set on 107,000 forest fires and 879 asynchronous district elections in Indonesia. Fires represent a cheap but illegal means of converting forested land to other uses, but risk burning out of control and creating substantial negative environmental externalities. We find a significant electoral cycle in forest fires. Ignitions and area burned decline during election years, but steeply increase in the year after. The results suggest that politicians may suppress this activity at times when it might particularly dent their electoral chances. Read more...
 

The Glittering Prizes: Career incentives and bureaucrat performance

With Guo Xu, Marianne Bertrand and Arunish Chawla

The Review of Economic Studies, 2020, 87(2): 626-655

Published Paper Online Appendix Replication Files

Press Coverage: ThePrint

Abstract
Bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations. Entry is competitive, promotion is based on seniority, jobs are often for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age. This implies that older entering officers, who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire, may be less motivated and exert less effort. Using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in India we provide evidence that: (i) officers who cannot reach the senior-most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended, (ii) this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age and (iii) states that contain a higher proportion of career capped officers perform less well but this effect is weakened by the pension reform. Together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance. Read more...

Working Papers

  1. Railroads and the Demise of Famine in Colonial India
    Robin Burgess and Dave Donaldson
    2017, Working Paper.
    Link to working paper

Published Papers

  1. Bureaucracy and Development
    Timothy J. Besley, Robin Burgess, Adnan Khan and Guo Xu
    2022, In: The Annual Review of Economics, 14: 397-424.
    Link to publication
  2. Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance
    Guo Xu, Marianne Bertrand, and Robin Burgess
    2021, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
    Link to publication
  3. Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia
    Clare Balboni, Robin Burgess, Anton Heil, Jonathan Old and Benjamin A. Olken
    2021, In: The American Economic Association: Papers and Proceedings.
    Link to publication
  4. The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance
    Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla, and Guo Xu
    2020, In: The Review of Economic Studies, 87 (2): 626–655.
    Link to publication
  5. War and Deforestation in Sierra Leone
    Robin Burgess, Edward Miguel, and Charlotte Stanton
    2015, In: Environmental Research Letters, 10 (9): 095014.
    Link to publication
  6. The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
    Robin Burgess, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel
    2015, In: American Economic Review, 105 (6): 1817–1851.
    Link to publication
  7. The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics
    Robin Burgess, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov, and Stefanie Sieber
    2012, In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (4): 1707–1754.
    Link to publication
  8. The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India
    Philippe Aghion, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti
    2008, In: American Economic Review, 98 (4): 1397–1412.
    Link to publication
  9. Entry Liberalization and Inequality in Industrial Performance
    Philippe Aghion, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti
    2005, In: Journal of the European Economic Association, 3 (2): 291–302.
    Link to publication
  10. Mass Media and Political Accountability
    Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess, and Andrea Prat
    2002, In: The Right to Tell : The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, edited by Roumeen Islam, published by The World Bank. Pages 45–60.
    Link to working paper
  11. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
    Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess
    2002, In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4): 1415–1451.
    Link to publication
  12. Political Agency, Government Responsiveness and the Role of the Media
    Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess
    2001, In: European Economic Review, 45 (4): 629–640.
    Link to publication
  13. Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India
    Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess
    2000, In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2): 389–430.
    Link to publication
  14. The Reform of Indirect Taxes in India
    Robin Burgess, Stephen Howes, and Nicholas Stern
    1995, In: India, the Future of Economic Reform, edited by Robert Cassen and Vijay Joshi, published by Oxford University Press. Pages 113–166.
    Link to book
  15. Value-added tax options for India
    Robin Burgess, Stephen Howes, and Nicholas Stern
    1995, In: International Tax and Public Finance, 2 (1): 109–141.
    Link to publication
  16. The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation
    Philippe Aghion, Olivier Blanchard and Robin Burgess
    1994, In: European Economic Review, 38 (6): 1327–1349.
    Link to publication
  17. Taxation and Development
    Robin Burgess and Nicholas Stern
    1993, In: Journal of Economic Literature, 31 (2): 762–830.
    Link to publication

Other papers

  1. Benchmarking Government Provision of Social Safety Nets
    Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess, and Imran Rasul
    2003, Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 27870, The World Bank.
    Link to working paper